Optimal play in 'Guess Who?'
David Cushing, Stuart Gipp, Ezra Levick, Em Rickinson, David I. Stewart

TL;DR
This paper derives an optimal strategy for the game Guess Who? under official rules, introducing a novel technique that allows for tripartite responses, enhancing strategic decision-making.
Contribution
It presents the first known optimal strategy for Guess Who? and introduces a new method for handling tripartite responses in game questions.
Findings
Optimal strategy for Guess Who? established
Technique for tripartite responses explained and applied
Enhanced strategic questions improve gameplay analysis
Abstract
We prove an optimal strategy for the children's game Guess Who? assuming the official rules are in use and that both players ask `classical' questions with a bipartite response. Applying a technique described in [Rabern, B \& Rabern, L 2008, 'A simple solution to the hardest logic puzzle ever', \textit{Analysis}, vol. 68, no. 2, pp.~105-112.] allows for questions with tripartite responses; we explain this innovation and give an optimal strategy for two players applying it.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsArtificial Intelligence in Games · Machine Learning and Algorithms · Game Theory and Voting Systems
