Collusion Resistant DNS With Private Information Retrieval
Yunming Xiao, Peizhi Liu, Ruijie Yu, Chenkai Weng, Matteo Varvello, Aleksandar Kuzmanovic

TL;DR
This paper introduces PDNS, a DNS extension that uses single-server Private Information Retrieval to enhance user privacy without relying on non-collusion assumptions, balancing privacy and performance.
Contribution
It proposes a novel DNS privacy solution integrating PIR, addressing hierarchical leakage issues, and demonstrates its practical implementation and performance evaluation.
Findings
PDNS achieves 2x faster performance than DoH over Tor.
Provides strong privacy guarantees without non-collusion assumptions.
Performance can be improved with specialized hardware.
Abstract
There has been a growing interest in Internet user privacy, demonstrated by the popularity of privacy-preserving products such as Telegram and Brave, and the widespread adoption of HTTPS. The Domain Name System (DNS) is a key component of Internet-based communication and its privacy has been neglected for years. Recently, DNS over HTTPS (DoH) has improved the situation by fixing the issue of in-path middleboxes. Further progress has been made with proxy-based solutions such as Oblivious DoH (ODoH), which separate a user's identity from their DNS queries. However, these solutions rely on non-collusion assumptions between DNS resolvers and proxies -- an assumption difficult to guarantee in practice. To address this, we explore integrating single-server Private Information Retrieval (PIR) into DNS to enable encrypted query processing without relying on trust assumptions. However, applying…
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