Cryptographic Data Exchange for Nuclear Warheads
Neil Perry, Daniil Zhukov

TL;DR
This paper introduces a cryptographic protocol for secure, verifiable tracking of nonstrategic nuclear warheads, enhancing treaty compliance verification without intrusive inspections.
Contribution
It presents a novel cryptographic 'Warhead Passport' system using zkSNARKs and commitment schemes for secure, privacy-preserving warhead verification.
Findings
Successfully integrates real-world cryptographic standards.
Ensures forward security against data manipulation.
Provides a practical framework for treaty verification.
Abstract
Nuclear arms control treaties have historically focused on strategic nuclear delivery systems, indirectly restricting strategic nuclear warhead numbers and leaving nonstrategic nuclear warheads (NSNWs) outside formal verification frameworks. This paper presents a cryptographic protocol for secure and verifiable warhead tracking, addressing challenges in nuclear warhead verification without requiring intrusive physical inspections. Our system leverages commitment schemes and zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (zkSNARKs) to ensure compliance with treaty constraints while preserving the confidentiality of sensitive nuclear warhead data. We propose a cryptographic "Warhead Passport" tracking system that chains commitments to individual warheads over their life cycle, enabling periodic challenges and real-time verification of treaty compliance. Our implementation…
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