Empirical structure physicalism and realism, Hempel's dilemma, and an optimistic meta-induction

TL;DR

This paper introduces a new concept of empirical structure and theory supervenience to argue that current sciences will eventually be reducible to future physics, supporting a form of physicalism and realism.

Contribution

It presents a novel notion of empirical structure and theory supervenience, offering a new argument against Hempel's dilemma and supporting empirical structure physicalism and realism.

Findings

Empirical structure physicalism avoids Hempel's dilemma horns.

Mental theories are empirically dispensable in the future.

Empirical structure realism is supported by an optimistic meta-induction.

Abstract

Motivated by a generalization of Hempel's dilemma, I introduce a novel notion of empirical structure, as well as theory supervenience as a new reductive relationship between theories. One theory supervenes on another theory if the empirical structure of the latter theory refines the empirical structure of the former theory. I then argue that (1) empirical structure physicalism, the thesis that the current special sciences supervene both on current and on future physics, avoids both horns of Hempel's dilemma; (2) in particular, mental theories remain empirically dispensable in the future; (3) empirical structure realism, the thesis that earlier theories of physics supervene on later theories of physics, is supported by an optimistic meta-induction; (4) this optimistic meta-induction can coexist with the well-known pessimistic meta-induction; (5) empirical structure physicalism is appropriately labeled as a type of physicalism; and (6) empirical structure physicalism is compatible with multiple realization. To illustrate the plausibility of empirical structure physicalism, I also briefly address the so-called knowledge argument.