GNSS Jammer and Spoofer Mitigation via Multi-Antenna Processing

TL;DR

The paper introduces SCHIEBER, a multi-antenna GNSS receiver method that effectively mitigates jamming and spoofing attacks without prior knowledge of attack type or receiver position, enhancing signal integrity.

Contribution

SCHIEBER combines adaptive spatial filtering for jammer mitigation with a novel DoA and pseudorange consistency test for spoofing detection, advancing GNSS security techniques.

Findings

Effective jammer mitigation during signal acquisition.

Successful spoofing detection through signal consistency testing.

Validated performance through extensive GPS L1 C/A simulations.

Abstract

Modern positioning relies on radio signals from global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). Their low receive power renders these radio signals susceptible to jamming attacks, in which malicious transmitters emit strong interference to disrupt signal acquisition. Moreover, GNSS are vulnerable to spoofing attacks, in which malicious transmitters mimic legitimate satellites by transmitting spurious GNSS signals. We propose SCHIEBER, a novel method for multi-antenna GNSS receivers that mitigates jammers as well as spoofers without requiring any prior knowledge of the receiver position or attack type: Jammers are mitigated during signal acquisition using a recently developed adaptive spatial filtering technique. Spoofers are identified and rejected after signal acquisition using a novel approach that tests the consistency of acquired signals by comparing their respective direction of arrival (DoA) and pseudorange estimates in a test that is invariant with respect to the unknown receiver position. We demonstrate the efficacy of our method using extensive simulations of a GPS L1 C/A system under spoofing and jamming attacks.