Quotas for scholarship recipients: an efficient race-neutral alternative to affirmative action?

TL;DR

This study evaluates France's scholarship quotas as a race-neutral policy that modestly improves access to selective programs for disadvantaged students without affecting overall higher education enrollment or application behaviors.

Contribution

The paper provides empirical evidence that scholarship quotas can enhance socioeconomic diversity in selective higher education programs without influencing application or pre-college investment.

Findings

Quotas increased access to selective programs for scholarship students.

No significant impact on overall higher education enrollment.

No change in application behavior or pre-college investment.

Abstract

Since 2018, France's centralized higher education platform, Parcoursup, has implemented quotas for scholarship recipients, with program-specific thresholds based on the applicants' composition. Using difference-in-differences methods, I find that these quotas enabled scholarship students to access more selective programs, although the intention-to-treat effects remain modest. Matching methods reveal that the policy improved the scholarship students' waiting list positions relative to those of comparable non-scholarship peers, and simulations suggest that the modest effect could be attributed to the low intensity of the treatment. However, I detect no robust or lasting effects on the extensive margin of higher education access. Despite high policy salience, quotas did not affect the application behavior or pre-college investment of scholarship students, even among high achievers. These findings align with research on affirmative action, suggesting that such policies primarily benefit disadvantaged students who access selective institutions, rather than expanding total enrollment. Nevertheless, scholarship quotas demonstrate that race-neutral alternatives can effectively promote socioeconomic diversity in prestigious programs.