Strategy Evolution in the Adoption of Conservation Tillage Technology under Time Preference Heterogeneity and Lemon Market: Insights from Evolutionary Dynamics
Dingyi Wang, Ruqiang Guo, Qian Lu

TL;DR
This paper models the dynamic adoption of conservation tillage technology among farmers, revealing how time preferences and market perceptions influence adoption patterns and informing sustainable policy design.
Contribution
It introduces an evolutionary game model incorporating heterogeneity in farmer time preferences and lemon market effects, providing new insights into technology adoption dynamics.
Findings
High time preferences hinder adoption due to discounting benefits.
Market benefit and loss levels determine stable coexistence or complex dynamics.
Policy measures like certification, subsidies, and taxes can influence adoption outcomes.
Abstract
The promotion of Conservation Tillage Technology (CTT) is critical for mitigating global soil degradation, yet their actual adoption rates remain substantially lower than anticipated targets. Existing research predominantly focuses on static factor analyses, failing to adequately capture the dynamic evolutionary mechanisms of farmer strategic interactions and the impacts of information asymmetries in agricultural markets. This study constructs an evolutionary game model integrating heterogeneous time preferences and lemon market effects to reveal the dynamic equilibrium of technology adoption within farmer groups operating under bounded rationality. Key findings indicate that farmers with high time preferences significantly impede CTT adoption due to the excessive discounting of long-term benefits. Furthermore, the lemon market effect dictates the system's equilibrium states: 1) When…
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