An Adversarial-Driven Experimental Study on Deep Learning for RF Fingerprinting
Xinyu Cao, Bimal Adhikari, Shangqing Zhao, Jingxian Wu, Yanjun Pan

TL;DR
This paper investigates the security vulnerabilities of deep learning-based RF fingerprinting systems through adversarial experiments, revealing exploitable backdoor behaviors and entanglement of device signatures with environmental features.
Contribution
It provides the first systematic adversarial analysis of DL-based RF fingerprinting, highlighting critical security risks and limitations of current approaches.
Findings
DL models misclassify devices under domain shifts
Misclassification can be exploited as backdoors for intrusion
Training on raw signals entangles device and environmental features
Abstract
Radio frequency (RF) fingerprinting, which extracts unique hardware imperfections of radio devices, has emerged as a promising physical-layer device identification mechanism in zero trust architectures and beyond 5G networks. In particular, deep learning (DL) methods have demonstrated state-of-the-art performance in this domain. However, existing approaches have primarily focused on enhancing system robustness against temporal and spatial variations in wireless environments, while the security vulnerabilities of these DL-based approaches have often been overlooked. In this work, we systematically investigate the security risks of DL-based RF fingerprinting systems through an adversarial-driven experimental analysis. We observe a consistent misclassification behavior for DL models under domain shifts, where a device is frequently misclassified as another specific one. Our analysis based…
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