A Stackelberg Game of Demand Response from the Aggregator's Perspective

TL;DR

This paper models a Stackelberg game for demand response, where an aggregator leads and consumers follow, optimizing load control and reducing electricity costs through a bilevel decision framework.

Contribution

It introduces a bilevel Stackelberg game model capturing the strategic interaction between an aggregator and consumers in demand response.

Findings

Effective load control for the aggregator.

Consumers achieve lower electricity bills.

Model demonstrates strategic demand response behavior.

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate on the modeling of demand response activities between the single aggregator and multiple participating consumers. The model incorporates the bilevel structure that naturally occurs in the information structure and decision sequence, where the aggregator assumes the role of a leader and the participating consumers play the role of followers. The proposed model is demonstrated to be effective in load control, helping the aggregator to meet the target reduction while the consumers pay cheaper electricity bill.