A Stackelberg Game of Demand Response from the Aggregator's Perspective
Seangleng Khe, Parin Chaipunya, Athikom Bangviwat

TL;DR
This paper models a Stackelberg game for demand response, where an aggregator leads and consumers follow, optimizing load control and reducing electricity costs through a bilevel decision framework.
Contribution
It introduces a bilevel Stackelberg game model capturing the strategic interaction between an aggregator and consumers in demand response.
Findings
Effective load control for the aggregator.
Consumers achieve lower electricity bills.
Model demonstrates strategic demand response behavior.
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate on the modeling of demand response activities between the single aggregator and multiple participating consumers. The model incorporates the bilevel structure that naturally occurs in the information structure and decision sequence, where the aggregator assumes the role of a leader and the participating consumers play the role of followers. The proposed model is demonstrated to be effective in load control, helping the aggregator to meet the target reduction while the consumers pay cheaper electricity bill.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic theories and models · Digital Platforms and Economics · Merger and Competition Analysis
