New allocation rule based on graph structures and their application to economic phenomena
Taiki Yamada, Taisuke Matsubae, Tomoya Akamatsu

TL;DR
This paper introduces the edge-based Shapley value, a new allocation rule for networked systems that better captures the contribution of interactions represented by edges, with applications in economic and logistical networks.
Contribution
It develops a novel edge-based Shapley value that shifts from node to edge contributions, establishing its theoretical basis and demonstrating its practical relevance.
Findings
Retains key properties like fairness and symmetry.
Produces intuitive allocations in content platform and supply chain networks.
Handles overlapping routes and cost-sensitive paths effectively.
Abstract
This study introduces the \emph{edge-based Shapley value}, a novel allocation rule within cooperative game theory, specifically tailored for networked systems, where value is generated through interactions represented by edges. Traditional allocation rules, such as the Shapley and Myerson values, evaluate player contributions based on node-level characteristics, or connected components. However, these approaches often fail to adequately capture the functional role of edges, which are crucial in systems such as supply chains and digital platforms, where interactions, rather than individual agents, are the primary drivers of value. Our edge-based Shapley value shifts the characteristic function from node sets to edge sets, thereby enabling a more granular and context-sensitive evaluation of the contributions. We establish its theoretical foundations, demonstrate its relationship to…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Rough Sets and Fuzzy Logic
