Without microphysical causation, just anything cannot begin to exist just anywhere

TL;DR

The paper examines the tension between the causal principle and Neo-Russellianism, arguing that objections based on the HEPP are not compelling for Neo-Russellians due to their view on causation in physics.

Contribution

It clarifies the relationship between the Causal Principle, HEPP, and Neo-Russellianism, showing that causation's absence in physics undermines HEPP-based objections.

Findings

HEPP is challenged by Neo-Russellian views.

Causation's absence in fundamental physics affects the validity of HEPP.

Objections based on HEPP are not persuasive for Neo-Russellians.

Abstract

According to the Causal Principle, anything that begins to exist has a cause. In turn, various authors -- including Thomas Hobbes, Jonathan Edwards, and Arthur Prior -- have defended the thesis that, had the Causal Principle been false, there would be no good explanation for why entities do not begin at arbitrary times, in arbitrary spatial locations, in arbitrary number, or of arbitrary kind. I call this the Hobbes-Edwards-Prior Principle (HEPP). However, according to a view popular among both philosophers of physics and naturalistic metaphysicians -- Neo-Russellianism -- causation is absent from fundamental physics. I argue that objections based on the HEPP should have no dialectical force for Neo-Russellians. While Neo-Russellians maintain that there is no causation in fundamental physics, they also have good reason to reject the HEPP.