The stability of bi-polarization on dynamical directed graphs: an emergent game perspective

TL;DR

This paper models opinion dynamics on directed graphs, showing that bi-polarization stability depends on an emergent game having an internal Nash equilibrium, linking opinion formation to evolutionary game theory.

Contribution

It introduces a co-evolutionary model connecting opinion updates and social relationships, revealing stability conditions of bi-polarization through an emergent game framework.

Findings

Bi-polarization stability is characterized by the emergent game having an internal Nash equilibrium.

The stability condition is explained by risk dominance and evolutionary stability.

The model provides insights into opinion formation on controversial topics.

Abstract

This paper proposes a co-evolutionary model of directed graphs and three opinions, i.e., conservative$(+)$, neutral$(\odot)$ and liberal$(-)$. Agents update both opinions and social relationships with bias. We find that an emergent game suffices to predict the stability of bi-polarization under a rare opinion updating limit and a large system size limit. The bi-polarization is stable if and only if the emergent game has an internal Nash equilibrium. The necessary and sufficient condition is explained by both risk dominance and evolutionary stability. This game approach facilitates us to reveal the stability of bi-polarization in empirical systems. Our work fosters the understanding of opinion formation for controversial topics, and shows a deep connection between opinion dynamics and evolutionary game theory.