TL;DR
This paper proposes a new, consistent theory of truth that resolves classical and constructive liar paradoxes, featuring an axiomatization of a global truth predicate and a non-paradoxical version of Frege's Basic Law V.
Contribution
It introduces a novel, provably consistent axiomatization of a global self-applicative truth predicate that addresses longstanding paradoxes in the philosophy of truth.
Findings
Provides a consistent axiomatization of truth
Resolves classical and constructive liar paradoxes
Defines a non-paradoxical form of Frege's Basic Law V
Abstract
I outline a new theory of truth that resolves the classical and constructive versions of the liar paradox. The theory features a provably consistent axiomatization of a global self-applicative truth predicate. Truth is defined using Tarski's "convention T", but compositionality is automatic. The correct, non-paradoxical form of Frege's Basic Law V is given. This paper is a (very) condensed version of the account of truth advanced in my recent book *Constructive Countablism*.
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