No Midcost Democracy

TL;DR

This paper demonstrates that intermediate voting costs, termed 'Midcost democracy,' can undermine majority rule, and suggests avoiding such institutional arrangements to preserve electoral outcomes that reflect the preferences of the majority.

Contribution

It introduces the concept of 'Midcost democracy' and analyzes how intermediate voting costs affect electoral outcomes, revealing non-monotonic effects on majority preference.

Findings

High or zero voting costs favor the majority-preferred candidate.

Intermediate costs disrupt the alignment with majority preferences.

Voting costs influence electoral outcomes in a non-linear way.

Abstract

Which level of voting costs is optimal in a democracy? This paper argues that intermediate voting costs - what we term a "Midcost democracy" - should be avoided, as they fail to ensure that electoral outcomes reflect the preferences of the majority. We study a standard binary majority decision in which a majority of the electorate prefers alternative A over alternative B. The population consists of partisan voters, who always participate, and non-partisan voters, who vote only when they believe their participation could be pivotal, given that voting entails a cost. We show that the probability of the majority-preferred alternative A winning is non-monotonic in the level of voting costs. Specifically, when voting costs are either high or negligible, alternative A wins in all equilibria. However, at intermediate cost levels, this alignment breaks down. These findings suggest that democratic systems should avoid institutional arrangements that lead to moderate voting costs, as they may undermine the majority principle.