Domestic frontier AI regulation, an IAEA for AI, an NPT for AI, and a US-led Allied Public-Private Partnership for AI: Four institutions for governing and developing frontier AI

TL;DR

This paper proposes four international and domestic institutions—an AI agency, a non-proliferation treaty, risk-based regulation, and a public-private partnership—to govern and develop frontier AI safely, securely, and collaboratively.

Contribution

It introduces a comprehensive framework combining governance, regulation, and collaboration models for frontier AI, inspired by existing international regimes like IAEA and NPT.

Findings

Compute governance can support international AI institutions.

A proposed AI agency could harmonize domestic AI regulations.

A non-proliferation regime for advanced chips could prevent misuse.

Abstract

Compute governance can underpin international institutions for the governance of frontier AI. To demonstrate this I explore four institutions for governing and developing frontier AI. Next steps for compute-indexed domestic frontier AI regulation could include risk assessments and pre-approvals, data centre usage reports, and release gate regulation. Domestic regimes could be harmonized and monitored through an International AI Agency - an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for AI. This could be backed up by a Secure Chips Agreement - a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for AI. This would be a non-proliferation regime for advanced chips, building on the chip export controls - states that do not have an IAIA-certified frontier regulation regime would not be allowed to import advanced chips. Frontier training runs could be carried out by a megaproject between the USA and its allies - a US-led Allied Public-Private Partnership for frontier AI. As a project to develop advanced AI, this could have significant advantages over alternatives led by Big Tech or particular states: it could be more legitimate, secure, safe, non-adversarial, peaceful, and less prone to misuse. For each of these four scenarios, a key incentive for participation is access to the advanced AI chips that are necessary for frontier training runs and large-scale inference. Together, they can create a situation in which governments can be reassured that frontier AI is developed and deployed in a secure manner with misuse minimised and benefits widely shared. Building these institutions may take years or decades, but progress is incremental and evolutionary and the first steps have already been taken.