Disentangling scientific realism from anti-exceptionalism

TL;DR

This paper challenges the assumed link between scientific realism and anti-exceptionalism, arguing that their connection is sociological rather than necessary, and explores the possibility of adopting anti-realism as the default scientific stance.

Contribution

It critically examines the relationship between scientific realism and anti-exceptionalism, proposing that their connection is contingent and not metaphilosophically necessary.

Findings

The link between realism and anti-exceptionalism is sociological, not necessary.

Anti-realism could serve as the default background view of science.

Drawing parallels with quantum foundations clarifies the assumptions involved.

Abstract

Scientific realism is, currently, one of the most well-entrenched background assumptions of some relevant versions of anti-exceptionalism about logic. We argue that this is a sort of sociological contingency rather than a metaphilosophical necessity. Drawing parallels with the metaphysics of science (as applied to quantum foundations), we try to bring the realist assumptions of anti-exceptionalism to light, to demotivate the necessary connection between realism and anti-exceptionalism, briefly exploring the possibility of adopting antirealism as the background default view of science instead.