Topology of the Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem
Matija Blagojevi\'c, Christof Sch\"utte

TL;DR
This paper extends the existence results of Nash equilibria in abstract economies by removing convexity assumptions, using algebraic topology tools, and provides new examples fitting these conditions.
Contribution
It generalizes Nash equilibrium existence theorems to non-convex abstract economies using topological methods, broadening applicability.
Findings
Generalized Nash equilibrium existence without convexity assumptions
Application of algebraic topology to equilibrium problems
New examples of abstract economies satisfying the main theorem
Abstract
The Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem refers to the question of the existence of a Nash equilibrium in an abstract economy. This model is due to Kenneth J. Arrow and Gerard Debreu in their pioneering work from 1954. An abstract economy is an extension of John Nash's original concept of a non-cooperative game from the 1950's. Here players selfishly seek to maximize their profits, which may depend on the others' choices. The novelty of an abstract economy is that the players may now mutually constrain each-other in their decision-making. A Nash equilibrium is reached when no player alone can increase his profit by a unilateral change of strategy. Abstract economies have found widespread applications from welfare economy, economic analysis and policy-making to constrained optimization, partial differential equations and optimal allocation. We generalize Leigh Tesfatsion's Nash…
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