Rectifying Adversarial Sample with Low Entropy Prior for Test-Time Defense
Lina Ma, Xiaowei Fu, Fuxiang Huang, Xinbo Gao, and Lei Zhang

TL;DR
This paper introduces a universal test-time defense method leveraging the low entropy prior in adversarial samples, improving robustness against unseen attacks through a two-stage rectification process.
Contribution
The paper reveals the low entropy prior in adversarial samples and proposes a novel two-stage REAL approach for test-time adversarial rectification based on this prior.
Findings
REAL significantly enhances existing rectification models' performance.
The low entropy prior is consistent across various attack types.
The method improves robustness against unseen adversarial attacks.
Abstract
Existing defense methods fail to defend against unknown attacks and thus raise generalization issue of adversarial robustness. To remedy this problem, we attempt to delve into some underlying common characteristics among various attacks for generality. In this work, we reveal the commonly overlooked low entropy prior (LE) implied in various adversarial samples, and shed light on the universal robustness against unseen attacks in inference phase. LE prior is elaborated as two properties across various attacks as shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2: 1) low entropy misclassification for adversarial samples and 2) lower entropy prediction for higher attack intensity. This phenomenon stands in stark contrast to the naturally distributed samples. The LE prior can instruct existing test-time defense methods, thus we propose a two-stage REAL approach: Rectify Adversarial sample based on LE prior for…
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Taxonomy
MethodsALIGN
