A contemporary approach on revisited cost allocation using airport games: the effects of code-sharing

TL;DR

This paper introduces a game-theoretic method for allocating airport fees in code-sharing scenarios, providing an exact solution that considers coalition configurations, and applies it to a real Spanish airport case.

Contribution

It proposes a novel configuration value for airport games with coalition configurations, offering an exact, parameter-dependent fee allocation mechanism for code-sharing operations.

Findings

Derived an exact expression for the configuration value in airport games.

Applied the model to a real Spanish airport case.

Demonstrated the effectiveness of the approach in a practical setting.

Abstract

An important operational aspect in airport management is the allocation of fees to aircraft movements on a runway, whether operated by separate operators or under code-sharing agreements. This paper analyses the problem of determining fees under code-sharing of the movements at an airport from a game theoretic perspective. In particular, we propose the configuration value for games with coalition configuration as the mechanism for allocating operating costs. We provide the exact expression of this game-theoretic solution for airport games, which depends only on the parameters of the associated airport problem. For this purpose, we consider a new and natural game-theoretic characterization of the configuration value. Finally, for the specific context of airport games, we apply it to a real case as a mechanism to determine the aircraft fees at a Spanish airport in a code-sharing scenario.