Iterated belief revision: from postulates to abilities
Paolo Liberatore

TL;DR
This paper explores the capabilities of various belief revision mechanisms, emphasizing their abilities to reach different belief states, beyond traditional postulate-based constraints, thus broadening understanding of belief change processes.
Contribution
It introduces the concept of abilities in belief revision, analyzing how different mechanisms can achieve various belief states, not just satisfy postulates.
Findings
Different revision mechanisms possess distinct abilities to reach belief states.
Certain mechanisms can achieve dogmatic or fully reachable belief states.
Abilities vary significantly across revision types, affecting their application potential.
Abstract
The belief revision field is opulent in new proposals and indigent in analyses of existing approaches. Much work hinge on postulates, employed as syntactic characterizations: some revision mechanism is equivalent to some properties. Postulates constraint specific revision instances: certain revisions update certain beliefs in a certain way. As an example, if the revision is consistent with the current beliefs, it is incorporated with no other change. A postulate like this tells what revisions must do and neglect what they can do. Can they reach a certain state of beliefs? Can they reach all possible states of beliefs? Can they reach all possible states of beliefs from no previous belief? Can they reach a dogmatic state of beliefs, where everything not believed is impossible? Can they make two conditions equally believed? An application where every possible state of beliefs is sensible…
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