Protocol insecurity with finitely many sessions and XOR
R Ramanujam, Vaishnavi Sundararajan, S P Suresh

TL;DR
This paper provides a new proof demonstrating the insecurity of protocols using XOR with finitely many sessions, employing typed terms to extend the applicability of previous insecurity results.
Contribution
It introduces a novel proof technique based on typed terms, removing previous restrictions on protocol classes for analyzing XOR-based protocol insecurity.
Findings
XOR protocols are insecure with finitely many sessions.
Typed proof methods can generalize insecurity results.
The approach simplifies analysis of protocol vulnerabilities.
Abstract
We present a different proof of the insecurity problem for XOR, solved in by Chevalier, Kuesters, Rusinowitch and Turuani (2005). Our proof uses the notion of typed terms and well-typed proofs, and removes a restriction on the class of protocols to which the [CKRT05] proof applies, by introducing a slightly different (but very natural) notion of protocols, where honest agent sends are derivable from previous receives in the same session.
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Authentication Protocols Security · Cryptography and Data Security · Distributed systems and fault tolerance
