Classical Logic without Bivalance
Alexander V. Gheorghiu

TL;DR
This paper presents a non-bivalent classical logic framework that addresses anti-realism, handles omega-incompleteness, and provides a simple consistency proof for Peano Arithmetic without transfinite methods.
Contribution
It introduces a semantics for classical logic without bivalence, enabling a new approach to metamathematics and foundational proofs.
Findings
Handles omega-incompleteness effectively
Makes induction a meaning-constitutive principle
Provides an elementary consistency proof for Peano Arithmetic
Abstract
Sandqvis's semantics for classical logic without bivalence resolves the question of an anti-realist account of classical reasoning after Dummett. This paper applies the framework to the essential questions of metamathematics. The system intuitively handles -incompleteness, makes induction meaning-constitutive, and yields an elementary consistency proof for Peano Arithmetic using only ordinary induction on the natural numbers, with no appeal to transfinite ordinals or recognition-transcendent truth.
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Taxonomy
TopicsLogic, programming, and type systems · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
