The assumptions that restrain us from understanding consciousness
Jaan Aru

TL;DR
This paper questions fundamental assumptions in consciousness research, suggesting that neural correlates may not be limited to spiking responses and that understanding consciousness requires exploring internal changes and revising traditional theories.
Contribution
It challenges core assumptions in consciousness science, proposing new directions such as examining internal consciousness changes and reconsidering neural correlates.
Findings
Neural correlates may extend beyond spiking responses.
Consciousness computations could be more complex than current models suggest.
Investigating internal consciousness changes like aha-moments can provide new insights.
Abstract
The science of consciousness has been successful over the last decades. Yet, it seems that some of the key questions remain unanswered. Perhaps, as a science of consciousness, we cannot move forward using the same theoretical commitments that brought us here. It might be necessary to revise some assumptions we have made along the way. In this piece, I offer no answers, but I will question some of these fundamental assumptions. We will try to take a fresh look at the classical question about the neural and explanatory correlates of consciousness. A key assumption is that neural correlates are to be found at the level of spiking responses. However, perhaps we should not simply take it for granted that this assumption holds true. Another common assumption is that we are close to understanding the computations underlying consciousness. I will try to show that computations related to…
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Taxonomy
TopicsParanormal Experiences and Beliefs · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology
