Reasoning about Bounded Reasoning
Shuige Liu, Gabriel Ziegler

TL;DR
This paper introduces a unified framework to distinguish between beliefs about opponents' types and reasoning depth in bounded reasoning models, clarifying their interpretation in experimental settings.
Contribution
It develops a novel approach by lifting static games into incomplete-information models, providing a clear language to separate beliefs from reasoning depth.
Findings
Analyzes three benchmark models: downward rationalizability, L-rationalizability, and C-rationalizability.
Clarifies what level-k behavior reveals about reasoning processes.
Provides epistemic foundations for classic bounded reasoning models.
Abstract
In experimental applications of bounded-reasoning models, behavior is often summarized by distributions of "levels". We argue that such summaries conflate two conceptually distinct dimensions: a player's type, capturing beliefs about what types their opponents might be, and the depth of higher-order reasoning about rationality. Distinguishing these dimensions matters for interpreting experimental evidence and for understanding when cross-environment variation should be read as changes in beliefs versus changes in cognitive depth, but existing frameworks provide no language to do so. We develop a unified framework by "lifting" static complete-information games into incomplete-information versions in which players are explicitly uncertain about opponents' types. Within this framework, bounded reasoning about opponents' types is represented by transparent first-order belief restrictions,…
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