Ultra Efficient Contracts: Pushing the Boundaries of Tractable Contract Design
Michal Feldman, Liat Yashin

TL;DR
This paper introduces a polynomial-time algorithm for optimal contract design under extsc{Ultra} rewards, expanding tractability boundaries in combinatorial action models and bridging the gap between substitutes and complements regimes.
Contribution
It presents the first polynomial-time algorithm for optimal contracts with extsc{Ultra} rewards, a class that extends beyond gross substitutes and includes non-subadditive rewards.
Findings
Polynomial-time algorithm for extsc{Ultra} rewards.
Bridging the gap between substitutes and complements regimes.
Extension to non-additive cost functions.
Abstract
We study the optimal contract problem in the \emph{combinatorial actions} framework of D\"utting et al.~[FOCS'21], where a principal delegates a project to an agent who chooses a subset of hidden, costly actions, and the resulting reward is given by a monotone set function over the actions. The principal offers a contract that specifies the fraction of the reward the agent receives, and the goal is to compute a contract that maximizes the principal's expected utility. Prior work established polynomial-time algorithms for \emph{gross substitutes} rewards, while showing NP-hardness for general submodular rewards; subsequent work extended tractability to \emph{supermodular} rewards, demonstrating that tractable cases exist in both the substitutes and complements regimes. This left open the precise boundary of tractability for the optimal contract problem. Our main result is a…
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