Open Sky, Open Threats: Replay Attacks in Space Launch and Re-entry Phases

TL;DR

This paper demonstrates how replay attacks can compromise spacecraft communication during launch and reentry, and proposes a more secure receiver design to mitigate these threats.

Contribution

It combines SDRs and channel emulation to replicate attack conditions and introduces a phase-coherency-based receiver enhancement for improved security.

Findings

Replay attacks can overpower legitimate signals with up to -7.8 dB SNR difference.

The proposed receiver design improves resilience against replay interference.

Experimental validation shows increased robustness of the new receiver configuration.

Abstract

This paper examines the effects of replay attacks on the integrity of both uplink and downlink communications during critical phases of spacecraft communication. By combining software-defined radios (SDRs) with a real-time channel emulator, we replicate realistic attack conditions on the Orion spacecraft's communication systems in both launch and reentry. Our evaluation shows that, under replay attacks, the attacker's signal can overpower legitimate transmissions, leading to a Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) difference of up to -7.8 dB during reentry and -6.5 dB during launch. To mitigate these threats, we propose a more secure receiver design incorporating a phase-coherency-dependent decision-directed (DD) equalizer with a narrowed phase-locked loop (PLL) bandwidth. This configuration enhances resilience by making synchronization more sensitive to phase distortions caused by replay interference.