Beyond the Scope: Security Testing of Permission Management in Team Workspace
Liuhuo Wan, Chuan Yan, Mark Huasong Meng, Kailong Wang, Haoyu Wang, Guangdong Bai, Jin Song Dong

TL;DR
This paper investigates security vulnerabilities in permission management within team workspace ecosystems, revealing widespread permission escalation risks through automated testing of interactions, highlighting the need for improved security measures.
Contribution
It introduces TAI, an automated tool for testing permission escalation risks in team workspace add-ons, and provides an in-depth analysis of vulnerabilities in current ecosystems.
Findings
41 problematic interactions identified
Permission escalation vulnerabilities are widespread
Automated testing effectively reveals security risks
Abstract
Nowadays team workspaces are widely adopted for multi-user collaboration and digital resource management. To further broaden real-world applications, mainstream team workspaces platforms, such as Google Workspace and Microsoft OneDrive, allow third-party applications (referred to as add-ons) to be integrated into their workspaces, significantly extending the functionality of team workspaces. The powerful multi-user collaboration capabilities and integration of add-ons make team workspaces a central hub for managing shared resources and protecting them against unauthorized access. Due to the collaboration features of team workspaces, add-ons involved in collaborations may bypass the permission isolation enforced by the administrator, unlike in single-user permission management. This paper aims to investigate the permission management landscape of team workspaces add-ons. To this end,…
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