Optimizing Bidding Strategies in First-Price Auctions in Binary Feedback Setting with Predictions
Jason Tandiary

TL;DR
This paper introduces a new algorithm for first-price auctions in a binary feedback setting that leverages predictions to achieve zero regret with accurate information, improving bidding strategies using machine learning insights.
Contribution
It proposes a novel algorithm within the BROAD-OMD framework that utilizes bid predictions to optimize bidding strategies in first-price auctions, achieving zero regret with perfect predictions.
Findings
Achieves zero regret with accurate bid predictions.
Establishes a bounded regret of O(T^(3/4) * Vt^(1/4)) under normality conditions.
Enhances the performance of auction bidding algorithms using machine learning predictions.
Abstract
This paper studies Vickrey first-price auctions under binary feedback. Leveraging the enhanced performance of machine learning algorithms, the new algorithm uses past information to improve the regret bounds of the BROAD-OMD algorithm. Motivated by the growing relevance of first-price auctions and the predictive capabilities of machine learning models, this paper proposes a new algorithm within the BROAD-OMD framework (Hu et al., 2025) that leverages predictions of the highest competing bid. This paper's main contribution is an algorithm that achieves zero regret under accurate predictions. Additionally, a bounded regret bound of O(T^(3/4) * Vt^(1/4)) is established under certain normality conditions.
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Advanced Bandit Algorithms Research · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
