Nondistortionary belief elicitation
Marcin P\k{e}ski, Colin Stewart
TL;DR
This paper characterizes conditions under which a researcher can elicit truthful beliefs from decision-makers without influencing their choices, providing mechanisms for three common problem classes.
Contribution
It identifies necessary and sufficient conditions for nondistortionary belief elicitation and characterizes all incentivizable questions within three canonical problem classes.
Findings
Established conditions for nondistortionary elicitation.
Fully characterized incentivizable questions in three problem classes.
Proposed variants of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism for belief elicitation.
Abstract
A researcher wants to ask a decision-maker about a belief related to a choice the decision-maker made; examples include eliciting confidence or cognitive uncertainty. When can the researcher provide incentives for the decision-maker to report her belief truthfully without distorting her choice? We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for nondistortionary elicitation and fully characterize all incentivizable questions in three canonical classes of problems. For these problems, we show how to elicit beliefs using variants of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism.
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