LURK-T: Limited Use of Remote Keys With Added Trust in TLS 1.3
Behnam Shobiri, Sajjad Pourali, Daniel Migault, Ioana Boureanu, Stere Preda, Mohammad Mannan, and Amr Youssef

TL;DR
LURK-T introduces a secure, flexible framework for sharing TLS keys with enhanced trust, decoupling cryptographic operations from servers using TEEs, and maintaining efficiency and security in CDN scenarios.
Contribution
It proposes a novel decoupling of TLS 1.3 server functions into a secure Crypto Service and Engine, enabling application-agnostic, attested, and protected cryptographic operations.
Findings
Efficient TLS handshake with no noticeable overhead for large files
Secure cryptographic operations verified with formal proofs
Flexible deployment options for CDN and server architectures
Abstract
In many web applications, such as Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), TLS credentials are shared, e.g., between the website's TLS origin server and the CDN's edge servers, which can be distributed around the globe. To enhance the security and trust for TLS 1.3 in such scenarios, we propose LURK-T, a provably secure framework which allows for limited use of remote keys with added trust in TLS 1.3. We efficiently decouple the server side of TLS 1.3 into a LURK-T Crypto Service (CS) and a LURK-T Engine (E). CS executes all cryptographic operations in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), upon E's requests. CS and E together provide the whole TLS-server functionality. A major benefit of our construction is that it is application agnostic; the LURK-T Crypto Service could be collocated with the LURK-T Engine, or it could run on different machines. Thus, our design allows for in situ…
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