Assessing the Resilience of Automotive Intrusion Detection Systems to Adversarial Manipulation
Stefano Longari, Paolo Cerracchio, Michele Carminati, Stefano Zanero

TL;DR
This paper investigates the vulnerability of automotive intrusion detection systems to gradient-based adversarial attacks across different knowledge scenarios, highlighting factors influencing attack success and real-time feasibility.
Contribution
It extends previous work by analyzing attack effectiveness under white-box, grey-box, and black-box conditions against state-of-the-art automotive IDSs using real datasets.
Findings
Attack success varies with attacker knowledge level.
Dataset quality and IDS type influence attack effectiveness.
Real-time attack payload precomputation is feasible.
Abstract
The security of modern vehicles has become increasingly important, with the controller area network (CAN) bus serving as a critical communication backbone for various Electronic Control Units (ECUs). The absence of robust security measures in CAN, coupled with the increasing connectivity of vehicles, makes them susceptible to cyberattacks. While intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been developed to counter such threats, they are not foolproof. Adversarial attacks, particularly evasion attacks, can manipulate inputs to bypass detection by IDSs. This paper extends our previous work by investigating the feasibility and impact of gradient-based adversarial attacks performed with different degrees of knowledge against automotive IDSs. We consider three scenarios: white-box (attacker with full system knowledge), grey-box (partial system knowledge), and the more realistic black-box (no…
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