Cooperation and the Design of Public Goods
J. Carlos Mart\'inez Mori, Alejandro Toriello

TL;DR
This paper models cooperation in public goods design using non-transferable utility linear production games, analyzing core properties, computational complexity, and applying the framework to transportation policy optimization.
Contribution
It introduces NTU LP games to formalize strategic cooperation in public goods, providing structural insights, complexity results, and a practical case study.
Findings
Core non-emptiness conditions identified
Core membership decision is co-NP-complete
Algorithm developed for social welfare optimization
Abstract
We consider the cooperative elements that arise in the design of public goods, such as transportation policies and infrastructure. These involve a variety of stakeholders: governments, businesses, advocates, and users. Their eventual deployment depends on the decision maker's ability to garner sufficient support from each of these groups; we formalize these strategic requirements from the perspective of cooperative game theory. Specifically, we introduce non-transferable utility, linear production (NTU LP) games, which combine the game-theoretic tensions inherent in public decision-making with the modeling flexibility of linear programming. We derive structural properties regarding the non-emptiness, representability and complexity of the core, a solution concept that models the viability of cooperation. In particular, we provide fairly general sufficient conditions under which the core…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Vehicle Routing Optimization Methods · Game Theory and Voting Systems
