Computational adversarial risk analysis for general security games
Jose Manuel Camacho, Roi Naveiro, David Rios Insua

TL;DR
This paper introduces a computational framework for security games using adversarial risk analysis, leveraging influence diagrams and simulation to handle complex scenarios, demonstrated through a disinformation war case study.
Contribution
It presents a novel computational scheme for general security games employing influence diagrams and augmented probability simulation, applicable to single and multi-stage scenarios.
Findings
Effective handling of complex security game scenarios
Theoretical convergence guarantees
Successful application to a disinformation war case study
Abstract
This paper provides an efficient computational scheme to handle general security games from an adversarial risk analysis perspective. Two cases in relation to single-stage and multi-stage simultaneous defend-attack games motivate our approach to general setups which uses bi-agent influence diagrams as underlying problem structure and augmented probability simulation as core computational methodology. Theoretical convergence and numerical, modeling, and implementation issues are thoroughly discussed. A disinformation war case study illustrates the relevance of the proposed approach.
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Taxonomy
TopicsInformation and Cyber Security · Military Defense Systems Analysis · Network Security and Intrusion Detection
