The Families that Stay Together: A Network Analysis of Dynastic Power in Philippine Politics

TL;DR

This study uses graph theory to analyze dynastic power in Philippine politics, revealing increasing clan influence, higher party-hopping among dynasts, and negative impacts on development linked to clan structures.

Contribution

It introduces four novel graph-theoretic metrics to quantify dynastic evolution and demonstrates their empirical relevance to political influence and development outcomes.

Findings

Dynasties are growing stronger and more interconnected.

Party-hopping is higher among dynastic candidates.

High clan power asymmetries correlate with lower development scores.

Abstract

Dynasties have long dominated Philippine politics. Despite the theoretical consensus that dynastic rule erodes democratic accountability, there is limited empirical evidence establishing dynasties' true impact on development. A key challenge has been developing robust metrics for characterizing dynasties that facilitate meaningful comparisons across geographies and election cycles. Using election data from 2004 to 2022, we leverage methods from graph theory to develop four indicators to investigate dynastic evolution: Political Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), measuring dynastic power concentration; Centrality Gini Coefficient (CGC), reflecting inequalities of influence between clan members; Connected Component Density (CCD), representing the degree of inter-clan connection; and Average Community Connectivity (ACC), quantifying intra-clan cohesion. Our analysis reveals three key findings. Firstly, dynasties have grown stronger and more interconnected, occupying an increasing share of elected positions. Dominant clans have also remained tightly knit, but with great power imbalances between members. Secondly, we examine variations in party-hopping between dynastic and non-dynastic candidates. Across every election cycle, party-hopping rates are significantly higher (p<0.01) among dynastic candidates than non-dynasts, suggesting that the dominance of dynasties may weaken institutional trust within parties. Finally, applying a Linear Mixed Model regression, controlling for geographic random-effects and time fixed-effects, we observe that provinces with high power asymmetries within clans (high CGCs) and with deeply interconnected clans (high CCDs) record significantly lower (p<0.05) Human Development Index scores. These findings suggest that clan structure, rather than power concentration alone--may be the chief determinant of a ruling dynasty's developmental impact.