Co-evolutionary Dynamics of Attack and Defence in Cybersecurity
Adeela Bashir, Zia Ush Shamszaman, Zhao Song, The Anh Han

TL;DR
This paper applies Evolutionary Game Theory to model and analyze the strategic interactions between cyberattackers and defenders, revealing stable states and implications for adaptive cybersecurity strategies.
Contribution
It introduces an EGT-based framework capturing attack-defense dynamics, identifying key equilibria, and demonstrating real-world applicability for improving cybersecurity resilience.
Findings
High defense intensity leads to system stability and minimal attacks.
Low defense environments are unstable and vulnerable to attacks.
The most stable state involves continuous attack and defense strategies.
Abstract
In the evolving digital landscape, it is crucial to study the dynamics of cyberattacks and defences. This study uses an Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) framework to investigate the evolutionary dynamics of attacks and defences in cyberspace. We develop a two-population asymmetric game between attacker and defender to capture the essential factors of costs, potential benefits, and the probability of successful defences. Through mathematical analysis and numerical simulations, we find that systems with high defence intensities show stability with minimal attack frequencies, whereas low-defence environments show instability, and are vulnerable to attacks. Furthermore, we find five equilibria, where the strategy pair always defend and attack emerged as the most likely stable state as cyber domain is characterised by a continuous battle between defenders and attackers. Our theoretical…
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Taxonomy
TopicsOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence
