Constitutional Consensus for Democratic Governance
Idit Keidar, Andrew Lewis-Pye, Ehud Shapiro, and Nimrod Talmon

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel democratic governance paradigm for digital communities using a constitution-based consensus protocol that ensures egalitarian decision-making and resilience against Sybil and Byzantine faults.
Contribution
It presents the first practical implementation of a constitutional, one-person-one-vote governance system combining distributed computing and social choice principles.
Findings
Developed a constitution-based democratic decision process
Designed a DAG-based Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus protocol
Achieved a smartphone-compatible, resilient governance solution
Abstract
Permissionless-consensus-based Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs) are the prevailing paradigm for participant-governed digital organisations. As participants have verified resources but no trusted identities, this ecosystem is necessarily plutocratic (one coin -- one vote). Here we offer, for the first time, a democratic (one person -- one vote) paradigm for the governance of digital communities and organisations, based on permissioned consensus and egalitarian decision processes. In line with Lamport's vision of consensus as a self-governing parliament, in the democratic paradigm a constitution specifies both a decision making protocol as well as a consensus protocol, combined to let participants amend the constitution through constitutionally-valid decisions that are ratified by consensus. To meaningfully instantiate this paradigm we integrate the disciplines of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAmerican Constitutional Law and Politics
