Military AI Needs Technically-Informed Regulation to Safeguard AI Research and its Applications
Riley Simmons-Edler, Jean Dong, Paul Lushenko, Kanaka Rajan, Ryan P. Badman

TL;DR
This paper emphasizes the need for technically-informed regulation of AI-powered lethal autonomous weapon systems (AI-LAWS) to address their unique risks, advocating for AI researchers' involvement in policy development.
Contribution
It introduces a behavior-based definition of AI-LAWS and proposes policy directions grounded in technical understanding to improve regulation and safety.
Findings
AI-LAWS pose risks like escalation and reliability issues.
Existing policies lack distinctions for AI-LAWS.
Technical definitions can improve regulation effectiveness.
Abstract
Military weapon systems and command-and-control infrastructure augmented by artificial intelligence (AI) have seen rapid development and deployment in recent years. However, the sociotechnical impacts of AI on combat systems, military decision-making, and the norms of warfare have been understudied. We focus on a specific subset of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) that use AI for targeting or battlefield decisions. We refer to this subset as AI-powered lethal autonomous weapon systems (AI-LAWS) and argue that they introduce novel risks -- including unanticipated escalation, poor reliability in unfamiliar environments, and erosion of human oversight -- all of which threaten both military effectiveness and the openness of AI research. These risks cannot be addressed by high-level policy alone; effective regulation must be grounded in the technical behavior of AI models. We argue…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEthics and Social Impacts of AI · Law, AI, and Intellectual Property
MethodsFocus
