Distribution through Repeated Market with Buying Rights
David Sychrovsk\'y, Jakub \v{C}ern\'y, Martin Loebl

TL;DR
This paper analyzes a repeated hybrid market with buying rights, demonstrating that such rights significantly improve fairness by reducing frustration and ensuring more equitable resource distribution over time.
Contribution
It introduces a novel analytical framework for a market with buying rights, showing how these rights enhance fairness and are coalition-proof, extending previous empirical research.
Findings
Buying rights reduce frustration by at least half compared to free markets.
The equilibrium in the market is a natural generalization of free market equilibrium.
Empirical results support the theoretical advantages of using buying rights.
Abstract
Resource distribution is a fundamental problem in economic and policy design, particularly when demand and supply are not naturally aligned. Without regulation, wealthier individuals may monopolize this resource, leaving the needs of others unsatisfied. While centralized distribution can ensure fairer division, it can struggle to manage logistics efficiently, and adapt to changing conditions, often leading to shortages, surpluses, and bureaucratic inefficiencies. Building on previous research on market-based redistribution, we examine a repeated hybrid market that incorporates buying rights. These rights, distributed iteratively by a central authority (for instance, as digital tokens), are intended to enhance fairness in the system - a unit of right is required to acquire a unit of the resource, but the rights themselves can also be traded alongside the resource in the market. We…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
