Can Large Language Models Design Biological Weapons? Evaluating Moremi Bio

TL;DR

This study demonstrates that large language models can be exploited to design highly toxic biological agents, highlighting significant biosecurity risks and the urgent need for mitigation strategies.

Contribution

It provides the first comprehensive assessment of LLM-enabled biodesign risks, showing how these models can generate toxic proteins and molecules, and proposes mitigation approaches.

Findings

Generated 1020 toxic proteins matching known toxins

Produced 5,000 toxic small molecules with high toxicity scores

Identified dual-use risks and proposed mitigation strategies

Abstract

Advances in AI, particularly LLMs, have dramatically shortened drug discovery cycles by up to 40% and improved molecular target identification. However, these innovations also raise dual-use concerns by enabling the design of toxic compounds. Prompting Moremi Bio Agent without the safety guardrails to specifically design novel toxic substances, our study generated 1020 novel toxic proteins and 5,000 toxic small molecules. In-depth computational toxicity assessments revealed that all the proteins scored high in toxicity, with several closely matching known toxins such as ricin, diphtheria toxin, and disintegrin-based snake venom proteins. Some of these novel agents showed similarities with other several known toxic agents including disintegrin eristostatin, metalloproteinase, disintegrin triflavin, snake venom metalloproteinase, corynebacterium ulcerans toxin. Through quantitative risk assessments and scenario analyses, we identify dual-use capabilities in current LLM-enabled biodesign pipelines and propose multi-layered mitigation strategies. The findings from this toxicity assessment challenge claims that large language models (LLMs) are incapable of designing bioweapons. This reinforces concerns about the potential misuse of LLMs in biodesign, posing a significant threat to research and development (R&D). The accessibility of such technology to individuals with limited technical expertise raises serious biosecurity risks. Our findings underscore the critical need for robust governance and technical safeguards to balance rapid biotechnological innovation with biosecurity imperatives.