Evaluating Voting Design Vulnerabilities for Retroactive Funding

TL;DR

This paper analyzes vulnerabilities in voting mechanisms used for RetroPGF on Optimism, combining formal proofs and simulations to identify weaknesses and suggest improvements for fairer reward allocation.

Contribution

It provides a formal analysis and empirical validation of vulnerabilities in existing voting schemes for RetroPGF, offering practical recommendations for system improvements.

Findings

Quadratic voting shows specific vulnerabilities.

Mean and median voting schemes have distinct weaknesses.

Recommendations improve fairness and robustness of RetroPGF voting.

Abstract

Retroactive Public Goods Funding (RetroPGF) rewards blockchain projects based on proven impact rather than future promises. This paper reviews voting mechanisms for Optimism's RetroPGF, where "badgeholders" allocate rewards to valuable projects. We explore Optimism's previous schemes for RetroPGF voting, including quadratic, mean, and median voting. We present a proof-based formal analysis for vulnerabilities in these voting schemes, empirically validate these vulnerabilities using voting simulations, and offer assessments and practical recommendations for future iterations of Optimism's system based on our findings.