Is Your Prompt Safe? Investigating Prompt Injection Attacks Against Open-Source LLMs
Jiawen Wang, Pritha Gupta, Ivan Habernal, Eyke H\"ullermeier

TL;DR
This paper evaluates prompt injection vulnerabilities in 14 popular open-source LLMs, introducing a new metric and demonstrating effective attacks that cause models to generate harmful content, emphasizing the need for mitigation.
Contribution
It introduces the Attack Success Probability metric and proposes simple yet effective prompt injection attacks against open-source LLMs, revealing significant vulnerabilities.
Findings
Hypnotism attack achieves ~90% ASP on several models.
Ignore prefix attacks break all tested models with over 60% ASP.
Moderately well-known LLMs are more vulnerable.
Abstract
Recent studies demonstrate that Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to different prompt-based attacks, generating harmful content or sensitive information. Both closed-source and open-source LLMs are underinvestigated for these attacks. This paper studies effective prompt injection attacks against the most popular open-source LLMs on five attack benchmarks. Current metrics only consider successful attacks, whereas our proposed Attack Success Probability (ASP) also captures uncertainty in the model's response, reflecting ambiguity in attack feasibility. By comprehensively analyzing the effectiveness of prompt injection attacks, we propose a simple and effective hypnotism attack; results show that this attack causes aligned language models, including Stablelm2, Mistral, Openchat, and Vicuna, to generate objectionable behaviors, achieving around % ASP. They also…
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Taxonomy
TopicsScientific Computing and Data Management · Digital Rights Management and Security · Access Control and Trust
