Destabilizing Power Grid and Energy Market by Cyberattacks on Smart Inverters

TL;DR

This paper assesses the risk and potential impact of large-scale cyberattacks on smart inverters in power grids, highlighting vulnerabilities and proposing insights for enhancing grid security in high PV penetration scenarios.

Contribution

It provides a realistic evaluation of cyberattack plausibility and impacts on power grid stability, based on Australian data and contingency analysis, emphasizing the need for robust defense strategies.

Findings

Cyberattacks can disrupt the grid but require careful planning to be impactful.

Current security measures are insufficient against sophisticated, orchestrated attacks.

Low levels of distributed PV can enable significant cyberattack impacts.

Abstract

Cyberattacks on smart inverters and distributed PV are becoming an imminent threat, because of the recent well-documented vulnerabilities and attack incidents. Particularly, the long lifespan of inverter devices, users' oblivion of cybersecurity compliance, and the lack of cyber regulatory frameworks exacerbate the prospect of cyberattacks on smart inverters. As a result, this raises a question -- "do cyberattacks on smart inverters, if orchestrated on a large scale, pose a genuine threat of wide-scale instability to the power grid and energy market"? This paper provides a realistic assessment on the plausibility and impacts of wide-scale power instability caused by cyberattacks on smart inverters. We conduct an in-depth study based on the electricity market data of Australia and the knowledge of practical contingency mechanisms. Our key findings reveal: (1) Despite the possibility of disruption to the grid by cyberattacks on smart inverters, the impact is only significant under careful planning and orchestration. (2) While the grid can assure certain power system security to survive inadvertent contingency events, it is insufficient to defend against savvy attackers who can orchestrate attacks in an adversarial manner. Our data analysis of Australia's electricity grid also reveals that a relatively low percentage of distributed PV would be sufficient to launch an impactful concerted attack on the grid. Our study casts insights on robust strategies for defending the grid in the presence of cyberattacks for places with high penetration of distributed PV.