Data Sharing with a Generative AI Competitor
Boaz Taitler, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz, Omer Ben-Porat

TL;DR
This paper models data sharing dynamics between a content firm and a Generative AI platform using game theory, revealing conditions under which data sharing is economically beneficial and how to optimize data exchange policies.
Contribution
It introduces a Stackelberg game model for data sharing between firms and GenAI platforms, analyzing equilibrium outcomes and pricing strategies for data exchange.
Findings
The firm may pay to share its data, leading to costly sharing equilibria.
Pareto improvements in data pricing are possible only when the firm pays for data sharing.
Optimal pricing strategies depend on the desired balance between firm and expert data acquisition.
Abstract
As GenAI platforms grow, their dependence on content from competing providers, combined with access to alternative data sources, creates new challenges for data-sharing decisions. In this paper, we provide a model of data sharing between a content creation firm and a GenAI platform that can also acquire content from third-party experts. The interaction is modeled as a Stackelberg game: the firm first decides how much of its proprietary dataset to share with GenAI, and GenAI subsequently determines how much additional data to acquire from external experts. Their utilities depend on user traffic, monetary transfers, and the cost of acquiring additional data from external experts. We characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game and uncover a surprising phenomenon: The firm may be willing to pay GenAI to share the firm's own data, leading to a costly data-sharing…
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Taxonomy
TopicsDigital Platforms and Economics · Auction Theory and Applications · Mobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing
MethodsSparse Evolutionary Training
