DNS Query Forgery: A Client-Side Defense Against Mobile App Traffic Profiling
Andrea Jimenez-Berenguel, C\'esar Gil, Carlos Garcia-Rubio, Jordi Forn\'e, Celeste Campo

TL;DR
This paper introduces a client-side DNS query forgery framework that enhances user privacy against mobile app traffic profiling by obfuscating DNS traffic patterns with minimal overhead.
Contribution
It models user profiles as interest distributions, evaluates three query forgery strategies, and proposes a practical modular system architecture for mobile device implementation.
Findings
50% privacy improvement with less than 20% traffic overhead
100% privacy protection requires 40-60% additional traffic
Effective obfuscation achieved without third-party trust or functionality loss
Abstract
Mobile applications continuously generate DNS queries that can reveal sensitive user behavioral patterns even when communications are encrypted. This paper presents a privacy enhancement framework based on query forgery to protect users against profiling attempts that leverage these background communications. We first mathematically model user profiles as probability distributions over interest categories derived from mobile application traffic. We then evaluate three query forgery strategies -- uniform sampling, TrackMeNot-based generation, and an optimized approach that minimizes Kullback-Leibler divergence -- to quantify their effectiveness in obfuscating user profiles. Then we create a synthetic dataset comprising 1,000 user traces constructed from real mobile application traffic and we extract the user profiles based on DNS traffic. Our evaluation reveals that a 50\% privacy…
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