TL;DR
ROSA is a novel fuzzing-based approach that detects runtime backdoor triggers in software, significantly improving automation and diversity in backdoor detection compared to prior methods.
Contribution
ROSA introduces a new metamorphic test oracle combined with AFL++ fuzzing to automatically detect backdoor triggers at runtime, and provides the first open benchmark for backdoor detection evaluation.
Findings
ROSA detects all 17 backdoors in the benchmark within 1.5 hours.
It handles diverse backdoors and programs without manual reverse-engineering.
ROSA achieves robustness, speed, and automation comparable to classical fuzzers.
Abstract
A code-level backdoor is a hidden access, programmed and concealed within the code of a program. For instance, hard-coded credentials planted in the code of a file server application would enable maliciously logging into all deployed instances of this application. Confirmed software supply chain attacks have led to the injection of backdoors into popular open-source projects, and backdoors have been discovered in various router firmware. Manual code auditing for backdoors is challenging and existing semi-automated approaches can handle only a limited scope of programs and backdoors, while requiring manual reverse-engineering of the audited (binary) program. Graybox fuzzing (automated semi-randomized testing) has grown in popularity due to its success in discovering vulnerabilities and hence stands as a strong candidate for improved backdoor detection. However, current fuzzing knowledge…
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