Stability in Single-Peaked Strategic Resource Selection Games
Henri Zeiler

TL;DR
This paper investigates the stability of resource selection games with heterogeneous agents and single-peaked utilities, providing bounds for equilibrium existence across various graph structures and information settings.
Contribution
It introduces the analysis of stability in heterogeneous, single-peaked resource selection games, deriving tight bounds for equilibrium existence on different graph topologies.
Findings
Tight bounds for equilibrium existence on cycles and binary trees.
Bounds for equilibria on arbitrary graphs with limited information.
Identification of cases where conventional methods fail to prove stability.
Abstract
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents has long been a key area of research, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games serving as prominent examples. In these traditional frameworks, agents choose from a set of resources, and their utility depends solely on the number of other agents utilizing the same respective resource, treating all agents as indistinguishable or anonymous. Only recently, the study of the Resource Selection Game with heterogeneous agents has begun, meaning agents have a type and the fraction of agents of their type at their resource is the basis of their decision-making. In this work, we initiate the study of the Resource Selection Game with heterogeneous agents in combination with single-peaked utility functions, as some research suggests that this may represent human decision-making in certain cases. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications
