Antagonistic coinfection in rock-paper-scissors models during concurrent epidemics
J. Menezes, R. Menezes, S. Batista, E. Rangel

TL;DR
This study models dual disease epidemics in a spatial rock-paper-scissors system, revealing how antagonistic coinfection and mobility restrictions influence spatial patterns, infection dynamics, and organism survival.
Contribution
It introduces a novel spatial model incorporating antagonistic coinfection effects and mobility restrictions, providing new insights into epidemic interactions and control strategies.
Findings
Antagonism reduces spatial pattern length scales.
Antagonism increases species population growth.
Mobility restrictions decrease infection risk and increase life expectancy.
Abstract
We investigate the dynamics of dual disease epidemics within the spatial rock-paper-scissors model. In this framework, individuals from all species are equally susceptible to infection by two distinct pathogens transmitted via person-to-person contact. We assume antagonistic mortality, where the simultaneous occurrence of coinfection reduces the probability of host mortality due to complications arising from either coexisting disease. Specifically, we explore two scenarios: global antagonism, where the presence of one pathogen inhibits the progression of the other in coinfected hosts, and uneven antagonism, where only one pathogen affects the development of the other. Using stochastic simulations, we show that the characteristic length scale of the spatial patterns emerging from random initial conditions diminishes as antagonism becomes more significant. We find that antagonism enhances…
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Taxonomy
TopicsCOVID-19 epidemiological studies · Zoonotic diseases and public health · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
