The Power of Matching for Online Fractional Hedonic Games
Martin Bullinger, Ren\'e Romen, Alexander Schlenga

TL;DR
This paper develops optimal online algorithms for coalition formation in fractional hedonic games, achieving constant competitive ratios regardless of agent valuation ranges, with applications to online matching problems.
Contribution
It introduces new algorithms with proven optimal competitive ratios for online coalition formation in fractional hedonic games, independent of valuation bounds.
Findings
Optimal $(rac{1}{3}-rac 1n)$-competitive algorithm under random arrivals.
Matching-based algorithm with $rac{1}{6 + 4\sqrt{2}}$ competitive ratio for arbitrary arrivals.
Identification of optimal online matching algorithms with weighted edges and unknown agent count.
Abstract
We study coalition formation in the framework of fractional hedonic games (FHGs). The objective is to maximize social welfare in an online model where agents arrive one by one and must be assigned to coalitions immediately and irrevocably. A recurrent theme in online coalition formation is that online matching algorithms, where coalitions are restricted to size at most , yield good competitive ratios. For example, computing maximal matchings achieves the optimal competitive ratio for general online FHGs. However, this ratio is bounded only if agents' valuations are themselves bounded. We identify optimal algorithms with constant competitive ratios in two related settings, independent of the range of agent valuations. First, under random agent arrival, we present an asymptotically optimal -competitive algorithm, where is the number of agents. This result…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Optimization and Search Problems · Auction Theory and Applications
