Second Price Matching with Complete Allocation and Degree Constraints
Rom Pinchasi, Neta Singer, Lukas Vogl, Jiaye Wei

TL;DR
This paper improves approximation guarantees for the Second Price Matching problem under certain degree constraints and introduces a new variant with expiring goods, providing both hardness results and exact algorithms for specific cases.
Contribution
It presents a new approximation guarantee of 9/10 for (3,2)-regular graphs, an exact polynomial-time algorithm for (d,2)-regular graphs with d≥4, and analyzes a variant with expiring goods.
Findings
Improved approximation guarantee of 9/10 for (3,2)-regular graphs.
Exact polynomial-time algorithm for (d,2)-regular graphs with d≥4.
Hardness of approximation within (1-1/e) for the expiring goods variant.
Abstract
We study the Second Price Matching problem, introduced by Azar, Birnbaum, Karlin, and Nguyen in 2009. In this problem, a bipartite graph (bidders and goods) is given, and the profit of a matching is the number of matches containing a second unmatched bidder. Maximizing profit is known to be APX-hard and the current best approximation guarantee is . APX-hardness even holds when all degrees are bounded by a constant. In this paper, we investigate the approximability of the problem under regular degree constraints. Our main result is an improved approximation guarantee of for Second Price Matching in -regular graphs and an exact polynomial-time algorithm for -regular graphs if . Our algorithm and its analysis are based on structural results in non-bipartite matching, in particular the Tutte-Berge formula coupled with novel combinatorial augmentation…
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Taxonomy
TopicsComplexity and Algorithms in Graphs · Optimization and Search Problems · Game Theory and Voting Systems
