On the Vulnerability of Underwater Magnetic Induction Communication

TL;DR

This paper reveals that underwater magnetic induction communication, previously considered secure, is vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks, with vulnerability highly dependent on the eavesdropper's position and orientation, and suggests potential detection methods.

Contribution

The study provides a comprehensive analysis of eavesdropping vulnerabilities in underwater MI communication through simulations and experiments, highlighting the impact of spatial configurations.

Findings

Eavesdropping vulnerability varies with eavesdropper position and orientation.

Simulation and experimental results confirm susceptibility to eavesdropping.

Potential detection method based on unique received coil behavior.

Abstract

Typical magnetic induction (MI) communication is commonly considered a secure underwater wireless communication (UWC) technology due to its non-audible and non-visible nature compared to acoustic and optical UWC technologies. However, vulnerabilities in communication systems inevitably exist and may lead to different types of attacks. In this paper, we investigate the eavesdropping attack in underwater MI communication to quantitatively measure the system's vulnerability under this attack. We consider different potential eavesdropping configuration setups based on the positions and orientations of the eavesdropper node to investigate how they impact the received voltage and secrecy at the legitimate receiver node. To this end, we develop finite-element-method-based simulation models for each configuration in an underwater environment and evaluate the received voltage and the secrecy capacity against different system parameters such as magnetic flux, magnetic flux density, distance, and orientation sensitivity. Furthermore, we construct an experimental setup within a laboratory environment to replicate the simulation experiments. Both simulation and lab experimental confirm the susceptibility of underwater MI communication to eavesdropping attacks. However, this vulnerability is highly dependent on the position and orientation of the coil between the eavesdropper and the legitimate transmitter. On the positive side, we also observe a unique behavior in the received coil reception that might be used to detect malicious node activities in the vicinity, which might lead to a potential security mechanism against eavesdropping attacks.